FSCS employs magic-based logic to compensate 159 LCF bondholders

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Last week I reported on the FSCS’ decision to compensate only 159 London Capital & Finance bondholders.

The decision to compensate only those who transferred stocks & shares ISAs to LCF, and not those who transferred cash ISAs, over a technical interpretation of the compensation handbook, has been a particular point of controversy.

The FSCS’ explanation in its LCF Q&A was

Arranging a transfer out of a regulated investment, such as a stocks and shares ISA, is a regulated activity.

As veteran investor activist Mark Taber pointed out to the FSCS on Twitter, cash ISAs are also regulated. The FSCS replied that what they meant to say was not regulated investment but designated investment.

We apply different sets of rules to different types of claim. If a bank fails, under the applicable Depositor Protection rules, a cash ISA qualified as a type of deposit that FSCS can protect.

However, for investment claims, under the applicable COMP rules, there is a strict requirement for there to be a ‘designated investment’ (see COMP 5.5.1(1)).

So there you have it – stocks and shares ISAs are “designated investments” under the FCA and FSCS handbooks but cash ISAs are not. Therefore compensation is payable where LCF transferred a stocks and shares ISA to its own invalid ISAs but not where it transferred a cash ISA. Does that explain everything?

No it doesn’t. If you’ve ever read a pulp fantasy novel, a Lord of the Rings knockoff, you will probably have read a paragraph like the following:

“The High Elves can use fire magic,” explained the wise wizard Fladnag to Odorf, “because their earliest ancestors were created from a star that fell from the sky, and the fire in that star remains in their blood. But the Wood Elves were made from the trees of the forests so they can only use the magic of nature.”

In the confines of fantasy novels this serves as an explanation as to why High Elves can do magic with fire. In reality it explains absolutely nothing. Using the words “because” and “so” doesn’t make it an explanation. At no point does the wizard explain what it is about your distant great-grand-parents being made from a star that gives you the ability to make magic fire. All the steps in between “great grandparent made from star” and “can summon fire” are missing. It is not an explanation, but random facts about elves.

This is fine in a pulp fantasy novel, as it’s a waste of energy coming up with actual scientific explanations, explanations where the steps in between aren’t missing, for things that aren’t real.

But the FSCS is doing exactly the same thing with ISAs in place of elves. “Stocks & shares ISAs are a designated investment but cash ISAs are only a regulated deposit” is not an explanation, it is random facts about ISAs. And this isn’t good enough, because it’s real life and whether compensation is awarded or not has a dramatic effect on real people’s lives.

What makes these facts irrelevant and random is that by the time the funds reached LCF’s hands, they were neither stocks & shares ISA funds or cash ISA funds. When a stocks & shares ISA was transferred to LCF, it was not LCF that sold the investments into cash but the original ISA manager. Any distinction between cash ISA funds and stocks and shares ISA funds had disappeared by the time they reached LCF’s hands for LCF to perform regulated activities upon them.

No part of the FSCS’ pseudo-explanation has managed to explain this away.

Cynicism abhors a logical vacuum

There is of course a real distinction between stocks & shares ISA LCF victims and cash ISA LCF victims that does provide a logical explanation for why only the former might get compensation.

There’s a lot fewer of them.

How many cash ISA LCF investors there are hasn’t been stated as far as I know. However, the archetypal LCF investor was your classic unsophisticated saver, sick of cash interest rates but lacking any experience of how to obtain real asset-backed returns without taking the risk of permanent loss. They went Googling for terms like “best interest rates” which LCF’s marketing provider Surge had sat on, and the rest is history.

Anyone with a stocks & shares ISA was inherently less likely to invest in LCF. They were already receiving potential returns higher than cash which takes away the main driver to go looking for LCF. They had at least some experience of capital-at-risk investments, via their stocks and shares ISA, and a higher ability to understand that LCF had an inherent risk of 100% loss, and giving them all your money was a bad idea for the same reason it is a bad idea to invest all your money in Lloyds shares.

Why 159 stocks & shares ISA investors managed to invest in LCF anyway is for them to come to terms with (fear of losses leaving them open to an investment that gave a false assurance of no volatility, maybe). It doesn’t matter as the point is that there are almost certain to be far fewer of them to compensate. 159 investors translates into a mere £3 million or so, assuming the typical average investment in LCF of c. £20,000.

Back in June 2019 when the FSCS was still dangling the prospect of compensating investors on the basis of misleading advice, I pointed out that this risked a number of unfair outcomes, including compensating richer investors who received personal visits from LCF salesmen while hanging poorer ones who didn’t out to dry.

I cynically suggested that the main benefit of rewriting the definition of “advice” in this way would be to remove the most organised and well-resourced investors from the investor groups – “divide and rule”.

Now we have the FSCS choosing to compensate a group who were by nature less unsophisticated and more experienced with investments than the average LCF investor, by virtue of the fact they already held capital-at-risk stocks and shares ISAs.

Those who had very little excuse for not understanding that LCF had an inherent risk of 100% loss are getting bailed out by the general public. Those who’d never held capital-at-risk investments before and likely had zero knowledge of how to diversify are still twisting in the wind.

There is no rational explanation for this, no matter how much the FSCS bleats about subsection C and paragraph 5.

Investor confidence

This isn’t a call for cash ISA investors to be compensated as well, and nor am I trying to piss on the lucky 159’s chips by saying they shouldn’t have been compensated.

This is about investor confidence. (I don’t expect LCF investors to care about macroeconomics over their own losses so they can put this article down if they’re still reading.) A financial compensation scheme needs to a) give retail investors enough confidence in the system not to hide their money under the mattress, and b) discourage retail investors from putting their money in the unregulated underbelly, where it is highly likely to be wasted, in the belief that it’s a risk-free bet.

By dangling the prospect that LCF investors might be compensated en masse over “misleading advice”, despite LCF not being an advisory firm, employing no financial advisers, and having no permissions to advise retail clients, the FSCS gave false hope to LCF investors for months. The nonsensical technical decision over stocks and shares ISA investors compounds the impression of a system in chaos.

The failure of the UK to regulate all investment securities offered to the public has created a fractured system where some unregulated investments are eligible for compensation and some aren’t, with no discernible logic.

The loopholes engineered by the current UK regulatory system allowed a business which was both unregulated and regulated, and offered high-risk unregulated securities that somehow still manage to be FSCS-protected in extremely limited circumstances, to exploit this lack of clarity for three years.

This is a shambles. A slaughterhouse into which investors will continue to be led until the system is reformed from the top down.

FSCS announces compensation for only 159 London Capital and Finance bondholders

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The hopes of most victims of FCA-authorised Ponzi scheme London Capital & Finance were dashed last week when the FSCS announced it would not compensate them on the basis of having received misleading advice.

It said that investors had merely been given incorrect information, which doesn’t generate a liability that is covered by the FSCS’ “protected business” rules.

That the FSCS has eventually taken this decision is disappointing for investors but ultimately not surprising. London Capital Finance was not authorised to give advice to retail investors, employed no qualified financial advisers, and its call centre staff were generally trained to avoid crossing the line from information to advice – as in any other non-advisory finance company. (Although some went off-piste and crossed the line into the “I’d tell my own mother to invest in this” school of advice.)

The surprising part is that the idea was floated by the FSCS and allowed to give false hope to tens of thousands for months.

That a suggestion that investors might be compensated on the basis of bad advice was even contemplated says a lot about how the industry and the public have been conditioned to accept the idea that the general public is liable for the losses of investors in high-profile scandals.

The unwritten rule in force in the UK is that if enough people believe an investment is risk-free, the Government has to spend everyone else’s money to make it so. This principle resulted in the bailout of defined benefit pension schemes, Equitable LifeBarlow Clowes, IceSave and Northern Rock.

London Capital and Finance has not yet crossed that threshold but investors are unlikely to give up here.

Stocks & shares ISA investors compensated

A sliver of LCF investors – 159 in total – will be compensated by the FSCS due to the fact that they transferred stocks & shares ISAs to London Capital & Finance. LCF claimed to offer ISAs but in reality their ISAs were invalid as the LCF bonds they invested in were non-transferable.

Those who transferred cash ISAs to LCF are however not eligible for compensation.

The fact that stocks and shares ISA investors get bailed out but those who transferred cash ISAs don’t merely highlights the arbitrariness of the FSCS’ decision.

Why the grounds on which stocks & shares ISA investors get compensated don’t apply to cash ISA investors is something I’m struggling to understand. I can only imagine it has something to do with the fact that advising on cash ISAs is not a regulated activity whereas advising on stocks & shares ISAs each, but LCF didn’t give advice, so… anyway, if I don’t understand it you certainly can’t expect the average LCF investor to.

A financial compensation scheme needs to accomplish two aims: it needs to give the person in the street confidence to put their money into the regulated financial system instead of under the mattress, so it can be put to best use. And it needs to make sure they know that if they go outside the regulated financial system, they’re on their own, because the unregulated financial system tends to piss money down the drain unless investors know exactly what they’re doing.

At the moment the FSCS is failing at both.

As it enters 2020 the UK’s financial system is overseen by a leaderless FCA that refuses to enforce existing rules and backed by a compensation scheme that makes up the rules as it goes along. Still, it’s not like the UK should be particularly worried about investor confidence right now.

LCF administrators release first six-monthly update

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Smith & Williamson, the administrators of £230m FCA-authorised Ponzi scheme London Capital & Finance, have released their first six-monthly update to investors.

The administrators are currently envisaging a return of “as low as 25%” to investors. This is predominantly based on expected recoveries from Independent Oil & Gas. All other LCF assets remain of extremely uncertain value.

This is actually an improvement on S&W’s initial forecast of 20% as a “best case” figure. But that is little cause for celebration, given that the LCF asset with the best hope of delivering returns for investors – the jewel in the crown, in S&W’s characteristically optimistic language – is its complex interests in Independent Oil and Gas.

An AIM listed oil exploration company may well have a better prospect of a return than, say, loans to failing resorts on Cape Verde, but that’s still a lot of chance involved.

As for those other investments:

LCF lent a total of £12 million to two companies investing in Cape Verde resorts, but the companies never took any legal title to land, and the recoverability of the loan is doubtful.

A total of £70 million was lent to the “Prime” companies investing in resorts in Cornwall and the Dominican Republic. The administrators’ efforts to establish whether these are worth anything have met with frustration.

We are very concerned that the management of Waterside, which is well aware that the Bondholders are depending on the LCF borrowers and sub-borrowers for their repayment, has made no efforts to engage with the administration to prove to the administrators either the value of the Waterside business or of the value of the security provided to secure the repayment of the debt. The administrators will be continuing to increase the pressure on Waterside’s management in this regard.

In regards to the proposed refinancing of the Prime group, as advised to us in February 2019 by the directors of Prime Resorts Developments Ltd, to our knowledge, there has yet to be any deal done and to date we have had no substantial response to our enquiries to give us any assurance as regards progress towards any refinancing or any useful update from Prime Resorts Developments Ltd with regard tothe general financial position of the company. […]

It is very surprising to the joint administrators that the Prime group is so extraordinarily reluctant to engage and consider this to be either suspicious or naive.

z-has-boltedAnd the hunt for LCF’s missing gee gees hasn’t gone much better.

Since our last report to creditors, we have continued our investigations in order to progress realisation of LCF’s assets for the benefit of creditors and Bondholders. In particular, we have requested that Mr Cubitt (the sole director and shareholder of FS Equestrian Services) attend for interview to assist us with our enquiries. We have also requested an up to date list of all FSE’s assets including the stock of horses (which were provided as security by FSE in respect of its borrowing from LCF), the names of such horses, their location and current value. In addition, we have requested details in relation to the sale of any horses and details of the use put to the proceeds of such sales. To date, Mr Cubitt has not attended voluntarily for interview.

As for £16.6 million invested in London Power & Technology, this seems to have disappeared.

We previously reported that this lending of £16.6m appeared to be in respectof a redemption of preference shares in London Power Corporation. Our investigations to date suggest that this transaction did not take place and furthermore, there does not appear to be any transaction to support lending of £16.6m.

So all eyes are still on Independent Oil and Gas, to which LCF lent a total of £38.6 million via its London Oil and Gas subsidiary.

IOG has agreed to farm out some of its Southern North Sea gas fields to CalEnergy Resources Limited. Should the deal go through, which is expected in September, IOG will get the cash to repay LCF’s non-convertible debt of £16.6 million, plus accrued interest.

LCF / LOG’s existing convertible loans will be renegotiated into unsecured loans convertible into shares at 8p and 19p, which the administrators will sell when they (and expert advisers) think the time is right.

At time of writing IOG currently trades at 18p. For conversion rights to be worth anything, the shares have to trade above the conversion price (otherwise you get more money from having the debt paid back). This suggests that S&W are still banking on IOG’s shares going up, and eventually getting back more than the £40 million that RockRose Energy offered for the debt back in March (which would have recovered the initial amount lent by LCF to IOG, plus change).

Another £5.4 million loaned to Atlantic Petroleum is said to have “high” prospects for being repaid.

Escrow payments

fourhorsemen
The Four Horsemen of LCF (clockwise from top right): Simon Hume-Kendall, Andy Thomson, Spencer Joseph and Elten Barker

Readers may remember that the Four Horseman of LCF, CEO Andy Thomson, Simon Hume-Kendall, Spencer Golding and Elten Barker, all of whom benefited from multi million pound sums arising from the Waterside and Dominican Republic investments going into their “personal possession or control”, were asked by S&W to repay those sums into escrow, to be repaid if LCF investors were repaid in full.

 

At the time of that report, S&W stated that Thomson and Hume-Kendall had agreed to this arrangement, while Golding and Barker had yet to reply.

None of the Four have paid up.

Thomson has claimed, from his sickbed and through his lawyers, that he never said any such thing.

Mr Thompson, through his lawyers, and notwithstanding his illness, has disputed he ever made such an offer.

(Note: S&W use both spellings of Thomson’s surname throughout the report; I have stuck with the one on Companies House.)

Hume-Kendall “continues to engage with the administrators albeit little progress has been achieved in their dealings with him.”

Golding and Barker, through their lawyers, have told S&W to swivel.

Spencer Golding and Elten Barker have indicated through their lawyers that the Bondholders should be fully repaid through repayments to LCF from its borrowers. Accordingly, the administrators do not anticipate that Mr Golding or Mr Barker will agree with the proposal to put funds into escrow.

The entire point of the escrow proposal is that if bondholders are fully repaid, the escrow funds will not be drawn on, and the Four Horsemen will get their money back. This appears to have fallen on deaf ears.

Given that S&W are forecasting recoveries of 25%, Golding and Barker are probably the only people in the country who think that LCF will fully repay bondholders.

Paul “Captain” Careless, the CEO of LCF’s marketing agent Surge, has also comprehensively lawyered up, hiring the Serious Fraud Office’s former top lawyer, according to the Evening Standard.

In March S&W was reported to have written to Surge to ask them to repay the profit (not their entire 25% commission) it made from selling London Capital & Finance bonds.

No mention of this or Surge’s response is made in the latest update.

Fees to date

S&W have so far incurred a total of £2.3 million in fees. A further £2.9 million has been incurred by professional advisers to the administration, of which lawyers Mischon de Reya account for the lion’s share of £2.5 million. £215k of other costs have not yet been approved.

Most of these fees remain outstanding, and the creditors’ committee has not yet approved S&W’s fees.

Only £3.6 million has so far been realised by the administration, mostly cash that LCF still had in the bank when it collapsed. This should in theory change quite shortly if the Independent Oil and Gas deal concludes as hoped.

5% dividends put on hold

At the creditors’ meeting in April, Smith & Williamson indicated to investors that they could be paid dividends in 5% increments, with the first dividend potentially arriving in the summer, if sufficient funds were realised.

At the Creditors’ Meeting held on 24 April 2019, it was stated that dividends would be paid to Bondholders in 5% increments, once sufficient net funds were realised. It was envisaged that it may be possible to pay the first dividend at the end of the summer, dependent on the outcome of the IOG investment.

This turned out to be another bout of S&W’s optimismitis.

Whilst it is anticipated that the IOG deal will complete in September, this first dividend is now very likely to occur later than originally hoped, because of the potential strategy as regards realising the administrators’ interest in IOG in an orderly fashion as advised by our specialist oil and gas advisers.

As Smith & Williamson needs to have covered its own fees, plus the fees of Mishcon de Reya and its other advisers, plus the future costs of any further attempts to pursue recovery from individuals or LCF’s assets, before it issues any dividends, investors should probably not hold their breath.

As is standard as part of administrators’ duties, S&W have submitted a report to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (that would be Andrea “having kids makes you a better Prime Minister” Leadsom, at least at time of writing) into the conduct of LCF’s directors.

As is equally standard, S&W remain tight-lipped over what was in it.

S&W states that there is a “concerted and very likely co-ordinated” exercise aimed at frustrating the administration process.

It is unfortunate that the administrators are being required to deal with a concerted and very likely co-ordinated exercise on the part of a number of individuals aimed at frustrating the joint administrators’ enquiries, for their own reasons. This approach causes delay and additional expense to the joint administrators’ objectives, to the prejudice of Bondholders and so is most unwelcome.

Who these individuals are is not made clear by S&W.

The next report is due in six months’ time.

LCF investors unable to obtain evidence for their compensation claims, administrator reveals

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A brief interim update sent by the administrators of London Capital and Finance reveals that a number of investors have contacted Smith & Williamson in an attempt to secure recordings of phone conversations between the investors and LCF.

The purpose of requesting these conversations is virtually certain to be to support claims against the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, which has confirmed that it will compensate investors who received recommendations to invest from employees of LCF’s marketing agent, Surge Financial, if they amounted to regulated advice.

We have received a number of communications from Bondholders recently, requesting recordings of their calls with LCF or Surge employees, in relation to their investments. It should be noted that:

  • The joint administrators do not yet have access to the call recordings database
  • The joint administrators are however taking steps for delivery up to them of call recordings
  • We understand that in parallel the FSCS are taking steps to secure call recordings.
  • Our understanding is that the telephone recordings are not comprehensive.For example, the joint administrators are aware that a number of calls were made from mobile phones and accordingly there will not be records of these calls held by the third party provider which maintains the call recordings database
  • We understand that the current third party provider only holds call recordings made/received during the last year prior to the FCA intervention in December 2018.

The inability of investors to obtain the evidence they need to make successful claims against the FSCS will likely exacerbate the potential injustice of the decision of the FSCS to compensate investors who received illegal but nonetheless FSCS-protected advice. Unless, of course, a more comprehensive and less arbitrary compensation scheme is set up.

In the world of actual regulated advice, this kind of issue almost never arises as it is a legal requirement to issue advice in writing. If that written advice is inadequate to support the recommendation, the investor has been mis-sold, and whether they were or were not told something else over the phone is virtually irrelevant. Any compliance consultant will tell you “if it’s not written down it didn’t happen.”

The decision to compensate investors largely on the basis of whether they were told over the phone that LCF was the best thing since sliced bread flips this equation on its head. Unfortunately for investors, if the FSCS takes the view that “if it’s not written down it didn’t happen”, then most LCF investors aren’t going to get compensation on the basis of being missold by LCF.

The FSCS has a big decision on its hands as to whether to take investors’ word for it as to whether they were given advice over the phone, given the lack of records that could prove or disprove their claim.

At present there will be numerous investors who spoke to LCF on the phone and were given the “I’d tell my own mother to invest in it” spiel. But cannot prove it due to the current lack of records.

There will also be numerous investors who only interacted with LCF via its website, never spoke to LCF over the phone, and never received anything that could be considered advice even by the FSCS’ relaxed standard. They are, as it stands, screwed.

Unless they invent a phone conversation if the FSCS decides that, given the lack of records, they will take the investor’s word for it in the absence of evidence to the contrary. We do not advocate committing fraud to secure FSCS compensation.

And on the other side the FSCS has to deal with the anger of the regulated advice sector, whose levies pay for the compensation scheme, who were not formerly aware that their levies allowed any FCA-regulated company to make a Ponzi scheme risk-free (up to £50,000 per person) by telling people, via an unregulated third party, that it was a good idea to invest in it.

The regulated advice sector knew this was the case for regulated financial advisers, who are required to pass exams and obtain a Statement of Professional Standing, but not for anyone who gets FCA authorisation for something like insurance intermediation. While the rules are old, the interpretation is new.

As it stands, no public action has been taken by the authorities against Surge Financial over the FSCS’ allegation it broke the law by giving regulated advice to retail investors without FCA authorisation. (LCF’s FCA permissions were for corporate finance business only.)

Intelligent Technology Investments

Smith & Williamson continues to spread its control through the further reaches of the London Capital & Finance web of companies.

Earlier this year S&W were appointed administrators of London Oil & Gas, which borrowed £122m from LCF, and in June S&W were appointed liquidators of Intelligent Technology Investments, which borrowed £5m from LOG.

ITI loaned £3m of this on to a company called Asset Mapping Limited.

Back in March, at the time of the initial administrators’ report, S&W said “Whilst AM has had some success in penetrating its market it is still seriously underperforming and short of the capital needed to develop its product further and for marketing costs”.

In April Asset Mapping went into administration, and was subsequently sold to its Chief Operating Officer Michael Grant, with funding from ex Nomura bankers Adrian Purvis and Gary Cottle, according to PlaceTech. It has now been renamed Metrikus.

According to S&W, “the consideration for the sale of this business is mostly contingent on the future performance of the business and so the return to LOG, and hence the LCF bondholders, is dependent on how that plays out.” The exact consideration and terms of future profit-related payments were not disclosed.

Another business which received funds from ITI was London Artifical Intelligence Limited, which according to the March report had developed software that could predict commodity prices with 85% accuracy (of one unspecified commodity). LAI has been overdue with its Companies House accounts since March 2019.

Elusive equine news

In other news for fans of metaphor, the Evening Standard’s Jim Armitage has revealed that S&W are almost literally trying to shut a stable door after the horses have bolted. Or more specifically, warning the wider equestrian world that if they should come across the bolted horses, they need to be put back in the stable right now.

Administrators to collapsed bond company London Capital & Finance are warning people in the equestrian world against buying horses from a stud farm that borrowed millions of pounds from the firm, the Evening Standard has learned. […]

Smith & Williamson said in a statement: “LCF has loaned very substantial funds to FS Equestrian and the administrators are getting no cooperation whatsoever in understanding where that value has gone.

“We would now put the equestrian world on notice that we will seek out all of the FS Equestrian horses which we have security over, irrespective of whose property they are on or whose possession they are in.”

FS Equestrian was owned by Spencer Golding, one of the Four Horsemen of LCF who were described in the initial administrators’ report as benefiting from millions of pounds which went into their personal possession or control, along with Andy Thomson, Simon Hume-Kendall and Elten Barker.

Spencer Golding declined to comment to the Evening Standard, as did Sean Cubitt, who took over FS Equestrian in January.

As prospects for recoveries go, it remains to be seen which has higher potential for recovery: FS Equestrian’s horses, or wondertech that predicts commodity prices with 85% accuracy.

Smith & Williamson’s next full update to bondholders is due to be delivered by 29 August.

How can LCF investors get compensation? A look at the options

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Last week we noted the FSCS’ reheated announcement that it would consider compensation claims by investors in London Capital and Finance if it deems they received advice from LCF’s marketing agent.

With the potential for some LCF investors to be compensated and not others, it seems a good time to have a review of the full range of options available to the Government to compensate LCF investors if it wants to, based on how it has done so in the case of other collapsed investment schemes.

Note: for the purpose of this article, the political fiction that the regulator is independent of the Government is ignored. The State is the State and taxpayers’ money is taxpayers’ money, even if it is collected via a levy on financial institutions which everybody uses rather than a tax which everybody pays.

Option 1. FSCS compensation for investors who received advice (the recently mooted option)

The rationale: Although LCF / Surge representatives were trained not to give advice, some of them nonetheless fell into statements which could be construed as advice, of the “I’d tell my own mother to invest in this” variety.

An investor who was advised by LCF to invest in LCF and consequently made a loss has a claim against them for bad advice, which (despite LCF not being authorised to give advice to retail investors) is covered by the FSCS now that LCF is in default.

The drawback: While this sounds great for any investor who can convince the FSCS they received advice, it will cover only a limited number of investors, as I described in my previous article. Moreover it has the potential to be inequitable as well as arbitrary. The investors who would be in line for compensation are more likely to be wealthy (thus meriting a personal visit from an LCF salesman as opposed to a chat with the call centre) and knowledgeable enough to make a case.

This basis can only cover all investors if the FSCS adopts the position that all of them received advice. Which in turn would mean that pretty much any investment company with a website about its products is providing advice and is FSCS-protected.

Option 2. FSCS compensation on the basis of “arranging investments” – aka the Independent Portfolio Managers option

The rationale: Independent Portfolio Managers was an obscure FCA-authorised company which produced the literature for two minibond investments – Secured Energy Bonds and Providence Bonds. Both collapsed after a few years. After some struggle, investors persuaded the FOS that Independent Portfolio Managers was liable to them in respect of “arranging (bringing about) deals in investments”, a protected claim which was covered by the FSCS.

The FSCS only began accepting claims against IPM last year but as far as we know, any investor in Providence or Secured Energy has a claim against IPM.

The drawback: IPM worked for Providence and Secured Energy as a third party. London Capital & Finance by contrast issued its own literature. It was an FCA-authorised company and did not need another one to sign off its promotions. The question is whether LCF can still be found liable on this basis in respect of its own bonds.

Law firm Shearman and Sterling think it can, a claim I have previously questioned.

So far the third party firm which authorised LCF’s promotions before it gained LCF authorisation, namely Sentient Capital London Limited, appears to have slid under the radar. Even if Sentient Capital London was to be found liable to LCF investors for the promotions it authorised, that would only apply to investors who invested at that time (i.e. before mid 2016).

Option 3. An ad-hoc compensation scheme – aka the Equitable Life option

The rationale: In the 1980s and 1990s the long-standing insurer Equitable Life rapidly grew its businesses by making guarantees to its policyholders that it couldn’t keep. The scheme collapsed in 1994; Equitable Life attempted to effectively renege on its guarantees by reducing the value of consumers’ policies, but this was eventually ruled unlawful in 2000. Unable to keep its promises and unable to renege on them, Equitable Life closed to new business.

Under the “With Profits” model popular at the time, Equitable Life investors’ money was not just managed by Equitable Life but to some extent invested in the insurer. Equitable Life’s hoovering up of investor money via promises it couldn’t keep led to significant losses for those customers.

After a series of government reports, the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman found that the Government and the regulators had made a series of failures in not preventing the Equitable Life collapse, and that the taxpayer must foot the bill for a £1.5 billion compensation scheme set up for Equitable Life investors.

The problem: Essentially that this option – to compensate investors from the taxpayer’s purse on the basis of the repeated failings of the Financial Conduct Authority – is fully at the discretion of the Government.

Option 4. Pay no compensation at all – aka the usual option where Ponzi schemes are concerned

Most Ponzi scheme collapses result in no compensation for investors whatsoever, unless they paid for individual regulated advice from an FCA-authorised adviser (or, in recent years, invested via a SIPP without advice).

To pluck a name out of thin air, there has been no public pressure (or none that has registered in the media) to compensate investors in Essex and London Properties PLC, which was shut down in late 2018 after taking £11 – 20 million of investors’ money.

The crucial difference is not the fact that Essex & London did not use an FCA-authorised firm to approve its literature, but that it wasn’t as big as LCF.

A succession of retail investment scandals from Allied Steel to Equitable Life and IceSave illustrate that if enough people believe that an investment is risk-free, the Government has to spend everyone else’s money to make it so.

Whether this threshold will be reached with London Capital & Finance is yet to be seen.

Footnote: Where does the money that actually belonged to investors stand in all this?

Having spent a few pages talking about how the general populations’ money could be used to compensate investors (whether via tax or FSCS levies), people might ask why we aren’t talking about returning the money they actually invested.

fourhorsemen
The Four Horsemen of LCF (clockwise from top right): Simon Hume-Kendall, Andy Thomson, Spencer Joseph and Elten Barker

Various amounts of London Capital & Finance investors money has been directed into the following:

 

  • £60 million of commission paid to its marketing agent, Surge Financial
  • The various investments detailed in the administrators’ report, such as Independent Oil & Gas, Prime Resort Development, magic software that predicts commodity prices, etc
  • The personal possession or control of the Four Horsemen of LCF; Andy Thomson, Simon Hume-Kendall, Elten Barker and Spencer Joseph, as a result of LCF investment related transactions
  • Sundry other costs and unknown destinations

The administrators have asked Surge to repay the profit it made from the commission payment. LCF’s various investments will at some point be realised by the administration.

As for the money which went into the personal possession of the Four Horsemen, the administrators asked them to pay it into escrow until LCF investors had received full payment. Hume-Kendall and Thomson have agreed to this, while as at March 2019 a response from the other two was pending. In addition, the Evening Standard has revealed that the Serious Fraud Office has put freezing orders on various properties owned by the Four.

Recoveries from any of these sources may take years if it happens at all.

If a compensation scheme of any variety pays out to LCF investors, it will take their place in the queue and become responsible for pursuing recoveries. The Government or the FSCS may be in a better position to ensure recoveries are maximised than lay investors. Or it may make no difference.

London Capital & Finance’s marketing agent dragged into extended warranty “consumer fraud” lawsuit

In September 2018 Domestic & General Insurance PLC sued Service Box Group Limited, accusing it of poaching its customers by ringing them up and lying to them that D&G had gone out of business or that their insurance had expired, and encouraging them to take out new policies with Service Box.

Since September 2017, Service Box Group Limited has been owned by Surge Group plc and its CEO Paul Careless.

Also part of Surge Group is Surge Financial, the company that ran London Capital & Finance’s marketing and received £60 million in commission in return.

D&G has now sought to drag Surge Group, Paul Careless, and three other Surge directors and shareholders into its lawsuit against Service Box, accusing them of “fraudulent misrepresentation”.

Jonathan Cohen QC, counsel for D&G, argued at Monday’s hearing before Master Matthew Marsh that Careless — who became the sole director of Service Box in October 2017 — and the other directors should be added as co-defendants so that the claim is directed at the “real wrongdoers.”

Paul Careless was arrested as part of a Serious Fraud Office investigation into LCF and released without charge the same day. Despite Careless remaining innocent until proven guilty, D&G cite his involvement in LCF as a reason for him to be included in the lawsuit.

D&G said the circumstances around Careless’ arrest should be considered by the court as so-called similar fact evidence to support the insurer’s allegation in its own case that he seeks to take advantage of unsophisticated consumers for his own financial gain.

“We have good evidence that he’s been engaging in other similar fraud beyond what we see in this case,” Cohen told the judge on Monday. “Of course I would want to put to him in cross-examination that: consumer fraud is what you do, looking at what you have done at London Capital and Financial [sic].”

Careless and Surge both deny any wrongdoing in respect of London Capital & Finance and Service Box.

Careless and Surge say they shouldn’t be added to Domestic & General’s suit, as there is insufficient evidence against them. Careless maintains that although he is an investor in Service Box through his role at Surge Group, he was not involved in the day-to-day running of the firm and that most of the allegations are said to have taken place before he became the sole director at Service Box.

D&G claim that Careless and Surge need to be added to the suit to prevent them winding up Service Box and carrying on under a new company.

In its application to amend, D&G said there was a risk that the directors could simply wind up Service Box and continue to commit the same alleged tortious acts of causing loss by unlawful means through a different corporation.

“We say it was a systematic fraud on customers,” Cohen said. “We think it’s remarkable that fraud continues to be denied. We think that they have no defense whatsoever.”

In its High Court claim, D&G alleged that Service Box’s representatives had phoned elderly and vulnerable customers, often by falsely claiming that they worked for a sister company of D&G.

The insurer first became aware of an increase in complaints from its customers about the sales calls in April 2017. The number of calls increased over time, and in April 2018, D&G received 580 customer complaints about them, according to court documents.

At Monday’s hearing, Cohen said the “striking similarity” of hundreds of call transcripts indicate that the low-level Service Box call center employees must have been schooled by senior staff on what to say to the D&G customers. D&G’s management obtained a script for the phone calls that was handed out at an induction week in October 2017, according to court documents.

“There’s no other way in which the scheme could work,” Cohen said, adding that even if they weren’t involved in the training, the judge needs to take into account the small size of the company. “It would have been impossible not to be aware of it, and yet it hasn’t been stopped.”

Service Box has rejected the allegations, arguing that it did not masquerade as D&G when phoning the claimant’s customers. It also insisted that, even if it promoted insurance plans under the name “Domestic and General,” consumers would not necessarily conclude that D&G is behind them.

On its own, the fact that Careless was arrested and then released without charge over a collapsed investment that had nothing to do with Service Box is pretty thin gruel to add to D&G’s case. D&G’s application may have more to do with money.

The first rule of civil law is don’t sue people who don’t have any money. Service Box’s last accounts for September 2018 show negative net assets of minus £1.7 million (mostly representing unspecified “other creditors”). Even if D&G won, whether Service Box would be able to pay damages is doubtful.

Surge Group as a whole, however, has lots of money, owing to the £60 million commission it received from London Capital & Finance. Careless personally has been described as a millionaire.

The case continues; the judge said he will rule on D&G’s application to have Careless and Surge added to its suit later this week.

FSCS confirms that it will consider claims against LCF for providing advice, again

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The Financial Services Compensation Scheme announced today that some London Capital & Finance investors may have claims which will be covered by the FSCS.

The FSCS has stated:

Following an extensive review of LCF’S business practices, we believe that Surge Financial Ltd, acting on behalf of LCF, provided a number of LCF clients with misleading advice. As this is a regulated activity, it means that FSCS protection would be triggered and that there may therefore be a number of customers with eligible claims for compensation.

The announcement was inevitably treated as breaking news, although in reality individual investors are in largely the same position as they have been for a number of weeks: that the FSCS may pay out for investors who were advised to invest in LCF (even though LCF was not authorised to advise retail investors and employed no qualified and practising advisers), but it will depend on investors being able to show that they did in fact get advice from LCF.

Back on 10 May the FSCS announced

The promotional materials that we’ve reviewed stated that the LCF mini-bonds were not FSCS protected. However, after a further review of LCF’s business practices, investment materials, and calls recorded with investors, FSCS is investigating whether regulated activities were carried out that might give rise to a claim.

This work and our legal analysis supports our view that LCF’s core activity of issuing their mini-bonds in the UK was not protected, but there are further issues that need examining. We’re focusing on whether there was any regulated advising, arranging or other activities that may trigger our compensation. We also need to better understand the nature of the relationship between LCF and Surge Financial Ltd.

The FSCS also confirmed at this time that the fact that LCF was not authorised to give advice was not an issue, as far as compensation eligibility was concerned.

Which was already written into the rules, but still came as a surprise to many. Many legitimate advisers paying FSCS levies were under the impression that they paid levies to cover qualified and regulated advisers who, despite those barriers to entry, misled their clients and then did a runner; not any Tom Dick or Harry who acts “on behalf of” any regulated firm, even if they have no advice qualifications and are not authorised to give advice. But they were wrong so here we are.

So for weeks we have already known that an investor who received bad advice from LCF and would be owed redress on that basis would be covered by the FSCS.

All that has happened with the latest announcement is that the FSCS has moved from saying that some people may have been given advice to some people were given advice.

Far from salvation

For the bulk of LCF investors this is very far from salvation as they don’t yet know whether “some people” includes them. It is still unclear whether the FSCS will assume that all LCF investors received advice, or whether it will require specific evidence from the investor.

At the moment, with the FSCS asking investors to fill in another questionnaire which asks investors whether they received advice (and which explains the difference between information and advice), it looks like the latter.

By contrast, in recent other cases where investors in unregulated investments were compensated due to the failings of an FCA-authorised firm, namely Independent Portfolio Managers, compensation was granted on grounds which covered all investors.

Unless the FSCS takes the borderline absurdist view that all LCF investors received advice from a non-advisory firm with no advisers, granting compensation on this basis is highly likely to be inconsistent and inequitable.

john-russell-murphy-45998522Recall that for the biggest clients, London Capital & Finance sent salesmen round to their homes, such as John Russell-Murphy, to sweet-talk them into investing. For these high-roller clients it is already known that they received (illegal and unqualified) advice, of the “I’d tell my own mother to invest in this” variety.

Compensating on the basis of advice means that a high-rolling LCF investor who had enough moolah to merit a personal visit from John Russell-Murphy could get compensated, whereas a poorer investor couldn’t.

The idea that someone who lost more money is more worthy of compensation is economically illiterate. The pain of financial loss depends not on how much money you lost but how much of your money you lost.

Elsewhere, an LCF investor who dealt with LCF entirely online may not be compensated as they have no claim that they received advice, whereas an LCF investor who rang LCF up could. As it’s questionable how good LCF and Surge were at retaining phone recordings for training, monitoring and future investor bail-out purposes, it could even come down to an investor’s word as to whether they received advice over the phone or not.

Assuming that the FSCS does require some actual evidence of advice being given before compensation, this is a solution that might draw the sting out of the investor action groups. As the investors with the most money and the most wherewithal to make a convincing case qualify for compensation, while those who can’t make a case are left to twist in the wind.

More like “divide and conquer” than “justice for LCF bondholders”.

FCA head wrings hands over London Capital and Finance

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In a much anticipated showdown with the Treasury Select Committee, FCA head Andrew Bailey made extensive use of the Glenn Beck Device.

The Glenn Beck Device, named after an emotionally incontinent US alt-fact pundit, involves saying something totally indefensible but phrasing it as a question, so that anyone who calls you out can be countered with “I’m not saying it is, I’m just asking questions”.

In this vein, Andrew Bailey admitted the colossal failures of the FCA over London Capital & Finance. But by ending the confession with a question mark, he avoided the only other way the sentence could have ended, i.e. “I resign”.

Bailey admitted that the FCA had intervened a total of five times over London Capital & Finance over its misleading financial promotions, but feigned confusion over why the company continued to take in inexperienced retail investors’ money in defiance of the FCA’s insipid bleating. Almost all of which now appears to be lost.

“The question which stands out for me is that the FCA intervened on five occasions with LC&F regarding financial promotions between 2015 and last year.

Why did they not have the effect they should have had?”

The obvious answer is “Because LCF was a Ponzi scheme and they couldn’t care less what the FCA thought, as long as the FCA didn’t stop them taking in money.” Which didn’t happen until December 2018, tens of millions of pounds too late.

Beck Bailey continued:

One of the big challenges we have in the mini-bond world is internet marketing. We have dedicated teams following this stuff. But the big question is what we can expect from internet companies Google, Facebook and the internet service providers?

So Bailey thinks that Google and Facebook should do the FCA’s job for it… no wait, of course he doesn’t, he’s just asking questions.

As JFK might say, when you’re a Government regulator with statutory immunity and a half-a-billion pound budget, ask not what you can expect from Google, but what Google can expect from you.

Google may be a billion-dollar company – with a tiny fraction of those billions now swallowing up the £20 million paid by LCF via Surge to take out misleading ads – but nobody seriously expects Google to turn down an advert for an apparently legitimate FCA-authorised company.

In UK law, responsibility for a financial promotion explicitly rests with the FCA-authorised company that approves it under Section 21 of the Financial Services and Markets Act. If it’s got Section 21 sign off (which all LCF’s adverts did, thanks to the FCA) an advertising platform can reasonably believe it to be kosher.

Google can not issue warnings about dodgy-looking companies soliciting investment from the public without risking a defamation suit; the FCA can as it has statutory immunity. Google cannot investigate companies and demand they open their books; the FCA can.

Whether Internet ad platforms should allow ads for unregulated investments is a matter for debate (of which the winner will be “No”), but LCF wasn’t unregulated.

So the buck bounces back to the FCA.

LCF’s misleading ads were not the only red flag waving long before December 2018. There was also the fact that LCF presented itself as a pseudo-P2P company offering secured lending to hundreds of small businesses, yet Companies House records showed only a handful of borrowers and security charges, all of which were linked to LCF directors.

This fact was in the public domain long before December 2018 but only entered the public consciousness after, because amateur sleuths only took an interest after LCF collapsed. A professional FCA investigator would have discovered the non-existence of LCF’s hundreds of SME borrowers much more quickly. If one had been looking. Which they didn’t.

The question of “What else could the FCA have done?” is not a difficult one to answer.

  • Instead of repeatedly and pointlessly “intervening” over LCF’s misleading promotions, demanded LCF provide the documentary evidence it was required to hold under COBS 4.12.9 onwards that all of its investors qualified as high-net-worth or sophisticated investors.
  • Because if LCF had repeatedly required “intervention” over its misleading ads, then there was a clear need to establish how many people had already been misled, and were holding LCF bonds when they shouldn’t.
  • On top of this, launch a formal investigation into LCF, demand its monthly management accounts and establish the true financial soundness of the business and its loans. Which of course would have led straight to the inevitable liquidation, but the earlier this was done, the less money would have been lost.
  • Because whenever a company is willing to flagrantly flout the rules on misleading adverts, the regulator should always be asking: what other rules is it breaking?

Bailey’s revelation that the FCA limply “intervened” five times into LCF before the shutdown in December 2018 makes the FCA’s failure even worse than we thought.

Until yesterday we thought the FCA had been oblivious to LCF until December 2018. It appeared to have paid no attention to LCF since it authorised it in 2016.

Bailey’s revelation that the FCA intervened a total of five times means the FCA was well aware of the potential harm before December 2018.

The FCA knew LCF was misleading the public through its ads. It follows that the FCA knew there were people holding LCF bonds who had been misled as to the risks and for whom ultra-high-risk minibonds were totally unsuitable. It also knew, after the second intervention, that LCF was a serial offender. And that the longer this went on the worse it would get.

But the FCA did nothing.

Breaking: Paul Careless, CEO of London Capital and Finance’s marketing agent, arrested

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Surge Financial CEO Paul Careless was arrested yesterday and questioned for four and a half hours, the Evening Standard has revealed.

Surge Financial was London Capital & Finance’s marketing agent. Another company in the Surge network, RPDigitalservices, which was controlled by Careless from July 2018 to April 2019, ran the top-isa-rates and best-interest-rates websites which channeled investors to London Capital & Finance using misleading comparisons between FSCS-protected deposit rates and LCF’s high-risk rates.

Around £60 million of LCF investors’ money was paid to Surge, of which £26 million was spent on marketing via Google, Facebook and other channels.

A spokesperson for Careless stated that he had not been charged and was not on bail.

They also stated that Surge “did not handle client money and had no involvement in the deployment of funds to borrowing companies”, thoroughly refuting something that nobody accused them of.

Sources close to Careless claimed that LCF’s administrator Smith & Williamson instigated the arrest to get Careless to hand over documents. S&W strenuously denied having anything to do with the arrest.

Careless becomes the fifth person to be arrested in connection with LCF, following LCF CEO Andy Thomson, LCF founder (and director of one of its largest borrowers) Simon Hume-Kendall, and two others who have so far not been publicly identified.

Google took £20 million from London Capital & Finance, The Times reveals

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The Times of London has revealed that of the £60 million commission paid by London Capital & Finance to its marketing agent Surge, £26 million was spent on marketing, of which £20 million went to Google.

Google was paid more than £20 million to promote high-risk mini-bonds for London Capital & Finance, the collapsed investment firm at the centre of a fraud investigation.

The Times has learnt that Surge Group, a digital marketing firm that was contracted by LCF to raise capital from investors, used the bulk of the money it spent on marketing to buy advertising via the search engine giant.

A person close to the matter said Surge spent about £26 million on marketing for LCF between 2015 and last year, with about 90 per cent of that sum going to Google.

 

Facebook advert for Top ISA Rates
Facebook ad for Top ISA Rates, part of the Surge Group which drove investors to London Capital and Finance.

To put that figure into context, a half-time advert at the NFL Superbowl costs about £4 million. Superbowl adverts are traditionally the biggest advertising opportunity on the planet, with £4 million buying you 30 seconds on front of 100 million people, or 800,000 human-hours of exposure.

But obviously London Capital & Finance wouldn’t have advertised at the Superbowl. The United States of America has meaningful securities legislation.

The fact that almost 10% of LCF investors’ money went to Google is fairly staggering. We already knew that Surge was an extremely expensive marketing channel for LCF, but didn’t know until now that the same was true of Google.

Until the ban on commission in 2012, regulated investments in the UK most commonly paid 3% initial commission to agents plus 0.5% each year or up to 7% without recurring commission. Even in the modern era, a marketing channel for an investment that costs £1 for every £10 you raise is a very expensive one.

The LCF administrators have already asked Surge to repay the profit element of the commission it received. Surge has so far not responded in public. Whether the administrators will make the same request of Google is yet to be seen, but the chances of Google repaying its £20 million seem slim to none.

It is worth bearing that £20 million figure in mind the next time Google claims it would be impractical to vet all of its ads to ensure it did not facilitate and receive stolen money from fraudulent investments or other scams by carrying their adverts.

Not that this applies to LCF. Thanks to the FCA giving it authorisation, even a prudent advertiser would have no qualms about allowing its Section-21-approved adverts onto the platform.

A spokesman for Google refused to comment. A spokesman for Surge says that LCF signed off all marketing materials and promotions.