Total losses expected for Bury FC car park investors; Bury FC debt sold for £70,000

The administrators of Mederco, which ran a number of unregulated investment schemes including one involving spaces in the Bury FC car park, have released a six-monthly progress report.

Since the initial proposals in March, a secured creditor has emerged, Capital Bridging Finance Solutions. CBFS loaned £333,000 to Mederco secured on a basement car park in Bradford. Mederco director and former Bury owner Stewart Day had told the administrators that this had been repaid. CBFS have now told the administrators this was inaccurate and that £152,291 remains outstanding.

Capital Bridging Finance Solutions has raised funds from investors via Capital Bridge ISA bonds paying 9% per year, reviewed here in October 2018. Hopefully the rest of their loans to “hand-picked property developers in the UK” are going a bit better. Capital Bridge states that it “takes significant security on all loans”. Whether the basement car park is sufficiently valuable to get its investors’ money back from Mederco remains to be seen.

(Thanks to reader Adam Smith for spotting the connection.)

CBFS’ outstanding loan is a secured one and ranks ahead of car park investors whose “guaranteed” payments were defaulted on, and anyone else who isn’t the administrators. Realisations are not anticipated to be enough to repay CBFS in full. As expected in the original proposals, total losses are therefore anticipated for unsecured creditors.

Bury FC

Substantial sums were invested by Mederco in Bury FC. The exact amount owed by Bury FC to Mederco could not be ascertained. Funds transferred from Mederco to Bury FC were treated as loans and subsequently converted to shares in the club. The administrators note that the share capital of Bury FC increased by approximately £5 million under Stewart Day’s tenure as at May 2017.

As anyone who takes an interest in English football knows, Bury FC is currently undergoing a Company Voluntary Arrangement. Had Mederco proved a “significant claim” against Bury FC, the administrators believe Bury FC would have been wiped out. The success of the Company Voluntary Arrangement is depedendent on football creditors being paid off by third parties, and Mederco enforcing whatever claim it has against Bury FC would have scuppered that, probably without any return to Mederco.

The administrators have therefore sold any claim Mederco may have to an unspecified “corporate entity”, with a personal guarantee, for a fixed sum of £70,000. (Who has provided the personal guarantee is also unspecified.) £20,000 has been paid as at the date of the report, with a further £50,000 due in monthly instalments up to January 2020.

The £20,000 initial payment is the only asset realised by the administration as at the date of the report.

Administrators to attempt to sell the remaining parking spaces

As described in our earlier article, Mederco developed a block of flats in Bradford known as Appleton Point. Mederco sold the flats to investors with a guaranteed yield of 9% per year.

Mederco sold the the freehold of Appleton Point in May 2015 to E & J Ground Rents No 1 LLP for £850,000, who subsequently leased the basement car park back to Mederco for 999 years at a peppercorn rent. Mederco then sold the car parking spaces to another batch of investors for £9,995 each, again for a guaranteed yield of 9% for five years with an uplifted buy-back after that.

Appleton Point failed a fire inspection earlier this year and residents were ordered to leave the property with 15 hours’ notice. The property management company is attempting to obtain the necessary funds from the long leaseholders to make the property safe.

The administrators state in the report that once the fire safety works have been completed, “we will look to market the six remaining under-leases for sale at the previously achieved price of £9,995 per space”.

Um, good luck with that.

Nobody is going to buy a car parking space in Bradford for £9,995 if it doesn’t come with a supposed guarantee to pay 9% a year. If Mederco could have sold the parking spaces for £9,995 a pop without offering to pay investors £900 a year and more than £9,995 to take it back five years later, they would have.

The problem with buying a car parking space as an investment, unlike a leasehold flat, is that whoever owns the car park has no incentive to put cars in your space before they fill up their own.

This is a problem with all vertical landbanking investment schemes whether the asset is a car parking space, hotel room or care home suite. It is not a problem with investing in, say, a buy-to-let flat where the leaseholder remains responsible for finding somebody to pay them to live in it.

Invariably this problem is solved by the operator of the investment scheme offering to lease the asset back from the investor in return for a “guaranteed” “assured” or “fixed” yield. This works until the operator runs out of money to meet the guarantee and stops paying the investor.

The administrators are, thankfully, not going to be telling investors to buy car parking spaces for £9,995 in the expectation of 9% per year returns plus an uplifted buyback from an already bankrupt company.

Who they are going to find to buy the parking spaces without any guarantees attached remains to be seen.

But that is largely moot to investors in the car parking spaces that were sold, as no returns are anticipated for them from the administration.

Administrators to pay accountancy fees to the other Day

One company that is going to get a return from the administration is Younique Accountancy.

Younique Accountancy (no relation to the makeup multi-level marketing scheme) were Mederco’s previous accountants and have been retained by the administrators “due to their historical knowledge of the Company and the cost efficiency in retaining them to assist the Joint Administrators”.

Younique are to be paid on a time cost basis. Accountancy fees are estimated at £5,000 by the administrators.

Younique’s sole director and owner is Neil Day. Any relation to Stewart Day? Their exact relationship is not public, but what is public knowledge is that Neil Day was a former director of other Stewart Day companies including Swish Property Limited (dissolved in 2013) and Rainbow Homes Limited (Neil resigned in 2013), which suggests it’s more than a coincidence.

It’s a sad fact that often the only beneficiary of an administration is the administrators whose fees always stand first in the queue.

When one of the recipients of those fees is the (brother? cousin? namesake and longstanding former business partner?) of the guy who ran the collapsed investment scheme, it’s an extra kick in the teeth for investors.

Harewood Associates administrators report: £40 million loaned to related parties, at most £4.2 million remains

Harewood Associates Logo

The administrators of collapsed unregulated property investment scheme Harewood Associates, Begbies Traynor, have released their first report.

Subsequent to the report, Harewood director Peter Kiely has signed a Statement of Affairs detailing how much of the company’s assets remain to be realised to investors.

An anonymised list of creditors shows that a total of £31.8 million was invested by 878 investors in its loan notes, an average of just over £36,000 per person. Amounts owed to creditors ranged from £5,000 to the largest investment of £788,481.

Currently unknown is the amount invested in shares issued by Harewood in Special Purpose Vehicles. At the moment administrators are deciding whether Harewood SPV investors should be considered creditors. Normally a shareholder of a company is not a creditor.

Back in 2016 Harewood claimed in a web promotion for their bonds:

If in the event that the Company did go into liquidation, the assets of the company would be sold off and the investors would be repaid. As we have substantial equity within each project, even at forced fire sale prices, there would be enough to repay the investors and deal with any staff, legal and accountancy commitments.

Turns out this was an aggressively overoptimistic statement.

According to the Statement of Affairs, Harewood loaned a total of £40.5 million to other related companies.

Of this, only £3.9 million is expected to be realised.

A £5,000 loan from a Paul Kiely, a £300,000 freehold property and £468 of cash in the bank brings the total estimated realisations to £4.2 million.

The administrators’ report lists a total of 9 related companies which owe money to Harewood. The administrators have written off 4 of these as not expected to provide any recovery. This includes the largest debts of £16.7 million owed to Harewood Venture Capital (which initially owned the liability of the investor creditors, but this was transferred to Harewood Associates in May 2018) and £19.2 million loaned to Sherwood Homes.

HVC is in liquidation (Begbies Traynor have taken over from the Official Receiver) while Sherwood Homes is still in existence, but has ceased to trade and holds no assets according to Peter Kiely.

As for the other five companies, the administrators are uncertain as to whether they will get anything from 3, and from the other 2 they anticipate getting something but cannot say how much.

The administrators have said that 84% losses before their costs is the current best case scenario. However this assumes that the five companies not already written off pay their debts back in full. Given the record of the other four, this would appear to be an optimistic assumption. In addition, the administrators’ fees (estimated at £276k as it stands) will come out before any payment is made to investors.

Equiscale

The administrators also refer to a company called Equiscale Limited which was acquired in March 2018 for £1.2 million. Equiscale owned a company called Geo. Noblett (Plant Hire), which in turn owned some land in Blackburn. The land was transferred to another Harewood company, Heron Homes, in April 2018 for £1.16 million. According to the administrators, Heron never paid Geo Noblett for the land.

Peter Kiely claims the shares in Equiscale were transferred to another company, Clifton Argyle Limited, in March 2018 and the proceeds deducted from money owed by Harewood to Clifton Argyle. The administrators say they “have not been provided with any evidence of this transaction and we are continuing with our investigations”.

So, in summary, Harewood used to own a company, but it doesn’t any more, and that company used to own some land, but it doesn’t any more, and it was never paid for that land, but as Harewood doesn’t own the company that wasn’t paid any more, that would seem to be moot from the investors’ perspective. In line with his statement to the administrators, Peter Kiely’s Statement of Affairs does not list the Equiscale investment.

How the bonds were sold

Harewood illegally promoted its loan notes and SPV shares directly to investors,  claiming it was exempt from the Financial Services and Markets Act because it was a property company.

Are we FCA regulated and is investment covered by the FSCS?
No we are not FCA regulated. All our investments are property related and therefore the Law and Property Acts apply.

The reality is that loan notes and shares issued by a property company are subject to the FSMA just like any other loan note or equity security. Companies which promote securities to the public in the UK require authorisation from the FCA. Neither Harewood Associates nor its directors were authorised by the FCA.

Website advert
Advert for Harewood’s bonds on their website, September 2016.
1_rm_bri_111018jasondonervan_07
Kebab vans are a proven safe and secure investment because drunk people always want sheep testicles and if it goes tits up the Security Trustee will step in and sell the van. Invest now.

As pseudolegal gibberish goes, Harewood’s argument is a bit like me encouraging the public to invest in bonds paying 12% per year in my kebab van, and saying I’m exempt from the Financial Services and Markets Act because I’m a kebab van and therefore the Food Safety Act applies.

Not only were investors investing in loans not property; it turns out that they weren’t even investing in loans to a property company. They were investing in loans to a company which made loans to other companies.

Despite Harewood claiming on the 2016 version of its website

Investments are secured by way of debentures on UK residential developments

and

All our investments are property related

FCA covered
Extract from Harewood Associates website in 2016.

a significant proportion of the underlying loans in Harewood Associates were, according to the administrators’ report, not secured on property. The administrators have written off four out of nine companies which owe Harewood Associates money. Which means that either these loans from Harewood Associates aren’t secured on anything, or if they are, the security is worthless according to the administrators.

These four debts account for £36.6 million of the £40.5 million owed to Harewood Associates – just over 90%.

What if anything will be realised from the other 10% is currently highly uncertain.

In a video promotion uploaded to YouTube in 2013, Harewood Associates claimed its bonds were “safe and secure” despite offering a “market beating rate of 12% per annum”.

So who are the Kielys?

Harewood Associates' David and Peter Kiely
Peter and David Kiely

For Harewood Associates director David Kiely, the experience of having his business collapse will be wearily familiar.

Back in 2005 David Kiely’s former business S-Mart Stores collapsed. A year later a pub company called Provence and another company called Do It Right UK, both owned by David’s brother Paul (the same one who loaned Harewood £5,000?) also collapsed.

The Morning Advertiser (a pub trade paper) reported back in 2006:

Paul Kiely’s brothers David and Shaun Kiely ran a firm, S-Mart Stores, that collapsed in identical fashion to Provence a year ago. Both firms sold hugely overvalued freehold properties to private investors on the promise of inflated rents.

[MP Jim] Dobbin tabled an Early Day Motion in the House of Commons in March 1998 which decried the activities of Provence founder Paul J Kiely and his brothers.

He described Kiely Developments as cowboy builders who “continually flouted builders regulations”. A year later the company, where Paul Kiely and brother Shaun Kiely served as directors, collapsed. This week Dobbin said: “I am not surprised to find that members of this family have been involved in a company which has again let down the people they claim to be working for. The Department of Trade needs to look seriously at their suitability for holding directorships. Maybe it is time for a fraud enquiry.”

As far as I can tell no fraud enquiry was ever launched, and you can’t blame one businessman for the failed businesses of their brother. There is therefore no suggestion that there was anything illegal about any of the Kielys’ businesses collapsing.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to see why any potential lender conducting basic corporate finance due diligence into Harewood Associates would not read about the collapse of David Kiely’s former business and the business history of the Kiely family as a whole,  and ask serious questions about the history of the directors, and whether their investment opportunity was as secure as they claimed.

But it is easy to say such things with hindsight. Harewoods investors weren’t doing due diligence. They thought they were investing in property so none was needed.

The fundamental belief behind the Financial Services and Markets Act is that novice investors who do not know what due diligence is, are not skilled in carrying it out, and do not know when they should carry it out, should not have high risk unregulated securities promoted to them by unregulated companies.

But Harewoods believed that didn’t apply to them because something something property.

So here we are.

£32.8 million raised from investors on the basis of illegal and misleading financial promotions and nearly all of it has disappeared.

No action has been taken against Harewood or their directors by the FCA or any other government body that is currently in the public domain.

MJS Capital assets overstated by £20 million, says administrators

According to the Evening Standard, the administrators of MJS Capital (aka Colarb) believe that CEO Shaun Prince has overstated its assets by £20 million.

Liquidator Asher Miller of David Rubin & Partners has written a report to creditors saying Colarb’s balance sheet cites assets of £39.7 million, of which Prince had said £27.7 million could be realised.  However, the report says Prince’s figure appeared to be “overstated by £20 million or more” based on earlier documents signed by Prince and MJS’s two biggest portfolio companies.

The biggest alleged overstatement was in the case of money invested with a Dubai firm called Angel World, where the £26 million valuation on the Colarb balance sheet was written as being worth only £5.3 million.

shaun prince
“MJS simply had cashflow issues… and should still be operating today” says former MJS Capital CEO Shaun Prince

CEO Shaun Prince blames the discrepancy on MJS Capital being put into liquidation, as a result of being unable to pay its debts to bondholders.

What the liquidation has to do with the discrepancy is unclear. Any administrator would have been free to let MJS Capital’s investments run their course if there was a realistic chance of getting a 400% return as a result.Prince has previously told the Evening Standard that MJS Capital took in c. £30 million from investors.

The administrators’ report is not yet on Companies House but we’ll bring you more when we have sight of it.

LCF administrators release first six-monthly update

London Capital & Finance logo

Smith & Williamson, the administrators of £230m FCA-authorised Ponzi scheme London Capital & Finance, have released their first six-monthly update to investors.

The administrators are currently envisaging a return of “as low as 25%” to investors. This is predominantly based on expected recoveries from Independent Oil & Gas. All other LCF assets remain of extremely uncertain value.

This is actually an improvement on S&W’s initial forecast of 20% as a “best case” figure. But that is little cause for celebration, given that the LCF asset with the best hope of delivering returns for investors – the jewel in the crown, in S&W’s characteristically optimistic language – is its complex interests in Independent Oil and Gas.

An AIM listed oil exploration company may well have a better prospect of a return than, say, loans to failing resorts on Cape Verde, but that’s still a lot of chance involved.

As for those other investments:

LCF lent a total of £12 million to two companies investing in Cape Verde resorts, but the companies never took any legal title to land, and the recoverability of the loan is doubtful.

A total of £70 million was lent to the “Prime” companies investing in resorts in Cornwall and the Dominican Republic. The administrators’ efforts to establish whether these are worth anything have met with frustration.

We are very concerned that the management of Waterside, which is well aware that the Bondholders are depending on the LCF borrowers and sub-borrowers for their repayment, has made no efforts to engage with the administration to prove to the administrators either the value of the Waterside business or of the value of the security provided to secure the repayment of the debt. The administrators will be continuing to increase the pressure on Waterside’s management in this regard.

In regards to the proposed refinancing of the Prime group, as advised to us in February 2019 by the directors of Prime Resorts Developments Ltd, to our knowledge, there has yet to be any deal done and to date we have had no substantial response to our enquiries to give us any assurance as regards progress towards any refinancing or any useful update from Prime Resorts Developments Ltd with regard tothe general financial position of the company. […]

It is very surprising to the joint administrators that the Prime group is so extraordinarily reluctant to engage and consider this to be either suspicious or naive.

z-has-boltedAnd the hunt for LCF’s missing gee gees hasn’t gone much better.

Since our last report to creditors, we have continued our investigations in order to progress realisation of LCF’s assets for the benefit of creditors and Bondholders. In particular, we have requested that Mr Cubitt (the sole director and shareholder of FS Equestrian Services) attend for interview to assist us with our enquiries. We have also requested an up to date list of all FSE’s assets including the stock of horses (which were provided as security by FSE in respect of its borrowing from LCF), the names of such horses, their location and current value. In addition, we have requested details in relation to the sale of any horses and details of the use put to the proceeds of such sales. To date, Mr Cubitt has not attended voluntarily for interview.

As for £16.6 million invested in London Power & Technology, this seems to have disappeared.

We previously reported that this lending of £16.6m appeared to be in respectof a redemption of preference shares in London Power Corporation. Our investigations to date suggest that this transaction did not take place and furthermore, there does not appear to be any transaction to support lending of £16.6m.

So all eyes are still on Independent Oil and Gas, to which LCF lent a total of £38.6 million via its London Oil and Gas subsidiary.

IOG has agreed to farm out some of its Southern North Sea gas fields to CalEnergy Resources Limited. Should the deal go through, which is expected in September, IOG will get the cash to repay LCF’s non-convertible debt of £16.6 million, plus accrued interest.

LCF / LOG’s existing convertible loans will be renegotiated into unsecured loans convertible into shares at 8p and 19p, which the administrators will sell when they (and expert advisers) think the time is right.

At time of writing IOG currently trades at 18p. For conversion rights to be worth anything, the shares have to trade above the conversion price (otherwise you get more money from having the debt paid back). This suggests that S&W are still banking on IOG’s shares going up, and eventually getting back more than the £40 million that RockRose Energy offered for the debt back in March (which would have recovered the initial amount lent by LCF to IOG, plus change).

Another £5.4 million loaned to Atlantic Petroleum is said to have “high” prospects for being repaid.

Escrow payments

fourhorsemen
The Four Horsemen of LCF (clockwise from top right): Simon Hume-Kendall, Andy Thomson, Spencer Joseph and Elten Barker

Readers may remember that the Four Horseman of LCF, CEO Andy Thomson, Simon Hume-Kendall, Spencer Golding and Elten Barker, all of whom benefited from multi million pound sums arising from the Waterside and Dominican Republic investments going into their “personal possession or control”, were asked by S&W to repay those sums into escrow, to be repaid if LCF investors were repaid in full.

 

At the time of that report, S&W stated that Thomson and Hume-Kendall had agreed to this arrangement, while Golding and Barker had yet to reply.

None of the Four have paid up.

Thomson has claimed, from his sickbed and through his lawyers, that he never said any such thing.

Mr Thompson, through his lawyers, and notwithstanding his illness, has disputed he ever made such an offer.

(Note: S&W use both spellings of Thomson’s surname throughout the report; I have stuck with the one on Companies House.)

Hume-Kendall “continues to engage with the administrators albeit little progress has been achieved in their dealings with him.”

Golding and Barker, through their lawyers, have told S&W to swivel.

Spencer Golding and Elten Barker have indicated through their lawyers that the Bondholders should be fully repaid through repayments to LCF from its borrowers. Accordingly, the administrators do not anticipate that Mr Golding or Mr Barker will agree with the proposal to put funds into escrow.

The entire point of the escrow proposal is that if bondholders are fully repaid, the escrow funds will not be drawn on, and the Four Horsemen will get their money back. This appears to have fallen on deaf ears.

Given that S&W are forecasting recoveries of 25%, Golding and Barker are probably the only people in the country who think that LCF will fully repay bondholders.

Paul “Captain” Careless, the CEO of LCF’s marketing agent Surge, has also comprehensively lawyered up, hiring the Serious Fraud Office’s former top lawyer, according to the Evening Standard.

In March S&W was reported to have written to Surge to ask them to repay the profit (not their entire 25% commission) it made from selling London Capital & Finance bonds.

No mention of this or Surge’s response is made in the latest update.

Fees to date

S&W have so far incurred a total of £2.3 million in fees. A further £2.9 million has been incurred by professional advisers to the administration, of which lawyers Mischon de Reya account for the lion’s share of £2.5 million. £215k of other costs have not yet been approved.

Most of these fees remain outstanding, and the creditors’ committee has not yet approved S&W’s fees.

Only £3.6 million has so far been realised by the administration, mostly cash that LCF still had in the bank when it collapsed. This should in theory change quite shortly if the Independent Oil and Gas deal concludes as hoped.

5% dividends put on hold

At the creditors’ meeting in April, Smith & Williamson indicated to investors that they could be paid dividends in 5% increments, with the first dividend potentially arriving in the summer, if sufficient funds were realised.

At the Creditors’ Meeting held on 24 April 2019, it was stated that dividends would be paid to Bondholders in 5% increments, once sufficient net funds were realised. It was envisaged that it may be possible to pay the first dividend at the end of the summer, dependent on the outcome of the IOG investment.

This turned out to be another bout of S&W’s optimismitis.

Whilst it is anticipated that the IOG deal will complete in September, this first dividend is now very likely to occur later than originally hoped, because of the potential strategy as regards realising the administrators’ interest in IOG in an orderly fashion as advised by our specialist oil and gas advisers.

As Smith & Williamson needs to have covered its own fees, plus the fees of Mishcon de Reya and its other advisers, plus the future costs of any further attempts to pursue recovery from individuals or LCF’s assets, before it issues any dividends, investors should probably not hold their breath.

As is standard as part of administrators’ duties, S&W have submitted a report to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (that would be Andrea “having kids makes you a better Prime Minister” Leadsom, at least at time of writing) into the conduct of LCF’s directors.

As is equally standard, S&W remain tight-lipped over what was in it.

S&W states that there is a “concerted and very likely co-ordinated” exercise aimed at frustrating the administration process.

It is unfortunate that the administrators are being required to deal with a concerted and very likely co-ordinated exercise on the part of a number of individuals aimed at frustrating the joint administrators’ enquiries, for their own reasons. This approach causes delay and additional expense to the joint administrators’ objectives, to the prejudice of Bondholders and so is most unwelcome.

Who these individuals are is not made clear by S&W.

The next report is due in six months’ time.

Hudspiths investors succeed in bid to force it into compulsory liquidation

102 creditors of Hudspiths have succeeded in having the company’s voluntary liquidation converted to a compulsory one, in a bid to gain more insight into what the collapsed unregulated scheme did with their money.

Hudspiths was an unregulated forex scheme that launched in 2015 and promised returns of 5% per month, along with 2% per month to be paid to its introducers. The scheme collapsed in 2018 and filed for voluntary liquidation in June.

Hudspiths investors were unhappy with the voluntary liquidation and believe that a compulsory liquidation will give them more power to find out where the £50 million they invested went.

They took the company to the High Court which ruled in their favour on 7 August.

The Official Receiver will now take over the liquidation.

A barrister for Hudspiths investors accused Hudspiths of running a Ponzi scheme. Hudspiths director, Fifty Shades of Grey fan Karl Lubienicki, has denied the allegation.

More to follow as and when the new liquidators report.

Curse of 2019 strikes again as Asset Life plc goes into administration

Asset Life plc, which raised £8 million from investors in its bonds, has gone into administration, according to reports. Confirmation of the administration was filed with Companies House on Wednesday.

David Rubin & Partners have been appointed as administrators, who are also currently investigating MJS Capital (aka Colarb).

We reviewed Asset Life plc’s bonds in January 2018.

Asset Life plc claimed to have an insurance policy in place which provided “Security of the Capital”. Exactly what this insurance covers is yet to be made clear, but no investment offering 8.75% per year to the public is fully insured against the risk of loss, and investors would be wise to manage their expectations.

The FCA issued a warning against Asset Life in May 2019, five years after Asset Life plc began selling its bonds.

Media spotlight fell on Asset Life plc after the collapse of London Capital & Finance, due to a connection between its directors.

Asset Life plc’s Chairman, Martin Binks, was a director of collapsed minibond firm London Capital & Finance from October 2015 to August 2016.

Since May 2014 Martin Binks has been a director of another former minibond firm, Anglo Wealth Limited. In December 2018 Anglo Wealth Limited was described as an “elegantly packaged scam” by a Southwark Crown Court judge, who sentenced two other Anglo Wealth directors, Terrence Mitchell and Andrew Meikle to suspended prison sentences and disqualification as directors.

Binks has not been accused of any wrongdoing in relation to his ongoing role at Anglo Wealth.

Despite the fact that the bulk of the Anglo Wealth funds were “dissipated on supporting the defendants’ lifestyles”, according to lawyers advising the CPS, Anglo Wealth investors were repaid in full.

With the collapse of Asset Life plc, the question of where the money to repay them came from is more urgent than ever.

Harewood investors told to expect at least 84% losses

Harewood Associates Logo

The Telegraph reports that investors in Harewood Associates have been told by the administrators, Begbies Traynor, to expect at least 84% losses, with a possibility of total loss.

A spokesman for Begbies Traynor, the administrators, said: “The proposals issued to creditors anticipate a range of returns between nil and 16p in the pound. The return is subject to realisations of debts due from associated companies.”

With the amount left in these associated companies unknown, the standard rule for investors in collapsed unregulated investment applies; expect nothing and treat any recovery as a bonus.

Begbies Traynor are due to deliver their initial report to Harewood’s creditors within the next few weeks.

While investors in Harewood’s loan notes are counted as creditors, other Harewood investors, who invested in shares in Harewood companies (SPVs or Special Purpose Vehicles) are currently in limbo.

In general, a shareholder of a company (including an SPV) can only realise their investment by either selling it to someone else or winding up the company. The former evidently isn’t going to happen.

Unlike creditors, shareholders have no power to call in administrators in that capacity. If they can get a controlling share together, they can wind the company up, but Harewood investors invested in preference shares with no voting rights, which appears to remove that option as well.

Harewood Associates illegally promoted its loan notes and SPV shares directly to investors. In 2016 it falsely represented on its website that its loan notes and SPV shares were exempt from UK securities law as they were property-related.

The reality is that while the sale of a property is not subject to UK securities law (even if it is sold as an investment), a loan note or equity security most definitely is. The fact that it is a share in / loan to a property company is irrelevant.

Soliciting investment in securities in the UK requires authorisation from the Financial Conduct Authority, which Harewood did not have.

Safe or Scam says Carlauren is not in administration, and is a Ponzi scheme; administrators appointed to Carlauren subsidiaries

Safe or Scam LLP, an American introducer which brings together investors in collapsed investments and insolvency practitioners / lawyers, has claimed in an open blog published on Monday 5 August that Carlauren has not appointed administrators, contrary to a statement from Carlauren in late July.

Carlauren claimed on 23 July that it had “instructed administrators”, and that “a full update with procedures and next steps will be distributed tomorrow”. A number of media outlets, including Bond Review, took this to mean that the company had gone into administration, especially against the background of Carlauren’s widely documented financial problems.

Safe or Scam however states:

This led to a number of media outlets picking up the story and reporting that Carlauren Group was in administration. It was not. As of today’s date it is still not in administration. We do not know why Carlauren Group would choose to mislead investors like this. We can only assume it was because they knew the use of the word “instructed” has no meaning in relation to an administration. The important word is “appointed” and Carlauren Group did not appoint any administrators. We can only assume this was a stalling tactic designed to prevent investors from combining to appoint an administrator. Carlauren was trying to buy time. As far as investors are concerned the only company in administration which is relevant to them is Accordiant Ltd. That company is the one which owes the rental payments.

Filings in The Gazette show however that Quantuma LLP were appointed last week as administrators to three Carlauren companies: Carlauren Care Limited, Carlauren Lifestyle Resorts Limited, and Accordiant Limited.

Quantuma LLP was recommended to Carlauren investors by Safe or Scam.

Carlauren Care and Carlauren Lifestyle Resorts are not mentioned in Safe or Scam’s blog but Accordiant is. Safe or Scam also says that Quantuma intends to place all Carlauren companies into administration.

Quantuma is representing creditors of Accordiant Ltd because that is its job and to do that effectively it must interview the people who controlled that company.  Murray is not going to take their advice because the Quantuma position is that ALL Carlauren companies ought to be placed into administration for the protection of creditors and assets.  We would be amazed if any administrator would ever consider taking advice from Sean Murray.  He is a man who buys a private jet with investor money and thinks elderly care can be paid for with a new kind of crypto-currency he has just devised.

So in short: Safe or Scam says that Carlauren as a group is not in administration, however three Carlauren subsidiaries definitely are according to the Gazette, and the administrators’ intention is to expand this to the whole group.

Ponzi allegations

Earlier in the blog, Safe or Scam alleges that Carlauren was a Ponzi scheme, whose business model was to buy properties and sell off the rooms at a 300% markup to investors, on the promise of a 10% per annum return.

Any returns the investor received, according to Safe or Scam, were funded by their own investment or those of others, rather than returns from the care home or any other business.

The model appears to be that a Carlauren SPV company buys a property for X. The bedrooms are then described as care studios and sold off to individual investors for 4X i.e a 300% mark-up. In some cases the mark-up was higher. The SPV company retains the freehold of each site along with ownership of communal areas such as restaurants, lounges, kitchens and gardens. […]

Another element of the investment was that investors were promised an unrealistic and unachievable guaranteed rental of 10% per annum.  This may have been achievable if the rental was based on the true market value of the bedroom e.g £20,000, but when Carlauren described these as “care studios” and was selling them for £100,000 each the rental commitment of £10,000 per year was impossible to achieve.  The only reason for selling rooms for £100,000 was to raise enough cash to give the investors some of their own money back under the pretence of it being their rental payments.  Needless to say all rentals on all sites ceased a few months ago. 

Carlauren Group letter to investors of 10th July 2019 states “week ending last Sunday realised the largest turnover since we began of £147,000, this equates to an annual turnover of £7.6m of which we estimate a net margin after hotel running costs of 35% (£2.67m)”.  Even when using their best ever week figures and applying that as a yearly revenue estimate, they admit they are currently £5m short every year on the rental payments they owe to investors.  Carlauren has never explained to investors how they were able to make the rental payments.  Perhaps it is time that they did.

Carlauren would have to admit that the payments came from the investor’s own money and then later from the money paid by new investors buying into the next property.  […]

It is worth pointing out that Carlauren Group has commitments to make rental payments to investors on more than a dozen sites which are still closed and non-operational.  Carlauren just kept buying more and more sites for X to sell at 4X because that was their only way to raise enough money to meet the ever-growing rental commitments.

Carlauren Group’s £2.5 million pad

Research by Safe or Scam into Companies House records shows that a Carlauren subsidiary named Carlauren Resort 22 Ltd borrowed money from Together Commercial Finance, secured against various Carlauren properties owned by various Carlauren special purpose vehicles, and a £2.5 million residential property in Poole bought by Carlauren Resort 22 itself, known as Western House.

Western House is described by its former estate agents as

An outstanding bespoke built residence situated in beautiful landscaped grounds of around one acre. Located in Branksome Park, a conservation area covering several hundred acres, an area renowned for its natural beauty with tree lined avenues, indigenous pines and rhododendrons.

Complementing the sophisticated interior is a superb outdoor swimming pool, as well as east facing manicured grounds lined by mature trees providing seclusion and privacy. A short drive away are the superb water sports facilities of Poole Harbour with several yacht clubs and marinas, as well as miles of Blue Flag award winning sandy beaches.

For what purpose Carlauren Group used investors’ money to buy Western House is not currently known. But it certainly sounds as if whoever lives there has been better provided for than Carlauren’s former care home residents.

As and when the Gazette or Companies House publishes updates on Carlauren’s administration or non-administration, we’ll bring you more…

LCF investors unable to obtain evidence for their compensation claims, administrator reveals

London Capital & Finance logo

A brief interim update sent by the administrators of London Capital and Finance reveals that a number of investors have contacted Smith & Williamson in an attempt to secure recordings of phone conversations between the investors and LCF.

The purpose of requesting these conversations is virtually certain to be to support claims against the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, which has confirmed that it will compensate investors who received recommendations to invest from employees of LCF’s marketing agent, Surge Financial, if they amounted to regulated advice.

We have received a number of communications from Bondholders recently, requesting recordings of their calls with LCF or Surge employees, in relation to their investments. It should be noted that:

  • The joint administrators do not yet have access to the call recordings database
  • The joint administrators are however taking steps for delivery up to them of call recordings
  • We understand that in parallel the FSCS are taking steps to secure call recordings.
  • Our understanding is that the telephone recordings are not comprehensive.For example, the joint administrators are aware that a number of calls were made from mobile phones and accordingly there will not be records of these calls held by the third party provider which maintains the call recordings database
  • We understand that the current third party provider only holds call recordings made/received during the last year prior to the FCA intervention in December 2018.

The inability of investors to obtain the evidence they need to make successful claims against the FSCS will likely exacerbate the potential injustice of the decision of the FSCS to compensate investors who received illegal but nonetheless FSCS-protected advice. Unless, of course, a more comprehensive and less arbitrary compensation scheme is set up.

In the world of actual regulated advice, this kind of issue almost never arises as it is a legal requirement to issue advice in writing. If that written advice is inadequate to support the recommendation, the investor has been mis-sold, and whether they were or were not told something else over the phone is virtually irrelevant. Any compliance consultant will tell you “if it’s not written down it didn’t happen.”

The decision to compensate investors largely on the basis of whether they were told over the phone that LCF was the best thing since sliced bread flips this equation on its head. Unfortunately for investors, if the FSCS takes the view that “if it’s not written down it didn’t happen”, then most LCF investors aren’t going to get compensation on the basis of being missold by LCF.

The FSCS has a big decision on its hands as to whether to take investors’ word for it as to whether they were given advice over the phone, given the lack of records that could prove or disprove their claim.

At present there will be numerous investors who spoke to LCF on the phone and were given the “I’d tell my own mother to invest in it” spiel. But cannot prove it due to the current lack of records.

There will also be numerous investors who only interacted with LCF via its website, never spoke to LCF over the phone, and never received anything that could be considered advice even by the FSCS’ relaxed standard. They are, as it stands, screwed.

Unless they invent a phone conversation if the FSCS decides that, given the lack of records, they will take the investor’s word for it in the absence of evidence to the contrary. We do not advocate committing fraud to secure FSCS compensation.

And on the other side the FSCS has to deal with the anger of the regulated advice sector, whose levies pay for the compensation scheme, who were not formerly aware that their levies allowed any FCA-regulated company to make a Ponzi scheme risk-free (up to £50,000 per person) by telling people, via an unregulated third party, that it was a good idea to invest in it.

The regulated advice sector knew this was the case for regulated financial advisers, who are required to pass exams and obtain a Statement of Professional Standing, but not for anyone who gets FCA authorisation for something like insurance intermediation. While the rules are old, the interpretation is new.

As it stands, no public action has been taken by the authorities against Surge Financial over the FSCS’ allegation it broke the law by giving regulated advice to retail investors without FCA authorisation. (LCF’s FCA permissions were for corporate finance business only.)

Intelligent Technology Investments

Smith & Williamson continues to spread its control through the further reaches of the London Capital & Finance web of companies.

Earlier this year S&W were appointed administrators of London Oil & Gas, which borrowed £122m from LCF, and in June S&W were appointed liquidators of Intelligent Technology Investments, which borrowed £5m from LOG.

ITI loaned £3m of this on to a company called Asset Mapping Limited.

Back in March, at the time of the initial administrators’ report, S&W said “Whilst AM has had some success in penetrating its market it is still seriously underperforming and short of the capital needed to develop its product further and for marketing costs”.

In April Asset Mapping went into administration, and was subsequently sold to its Chief Operating Officer Michael Grant, with funding from ex Nomura bankers Adrian Purvis and Gary Cottle, according to PlaceTech. It has now been renamed Metrikus.

According to S&W, “the consideration for the sale of this business is mostly contingent on the future performance of the business and so the return to LOG, and hence the LCF bondholders, is dependent on how that plays out.” The exact consideration and terms of future profit-related payments were not disclosed.

Another business which received funds from ITI was London Artifical Intelligence Limited, which according to the March report had developed software that could predict commodity prices with 85% accuracy (of one unspecified commodity). LAI has been overdue with its Companies House accounts since March 2019.

Elusive equine news

In other news for fans of metaphor, the Evening Standard’s Jim Armitage has revealed that S&W are almost literally trying to shut a stable door after the horses have bolted. Or more specifically, warning the wider equestrian world that if they should come across the bolted horses, they need to be put back in the stable right now.

Administrators to collapsed bond company London Capital & Finance are warning people in the equestrian world against buying horses from a stud farm that borrowed millions of pounds from the firm, the Evening Standard has learned. […]

Smith & Williamson said in a statement: “LCF has loaned very substantial funds to FS Equestrian and the administrators are getting no cooperation whatsoever in understanding where that value has gone.

“We would now put the equestrian world on notice that we will seek out all of the FS Equestrian horses which we have security over, irrespective of whose property they are on or whose possession they are in.”

FS Equestrian was owned by Spencer Golding, one of the Four Horsemen of LCF who were described in the initial administrators’ report as benefiting from millions of pounds which went into their personal possession or control, along with Andy Thomson, Simon Hume-Kendall and Elten Barker.

Spencer Golding declined to comment to the Evening Standard, as did Sean Cubitt, who took over FS Equestrian in January.

As prospects for recoveries go, it remains to be seen which has higher potential for recovery: FS Equestrian’s horses, or wondertech that predicts commodity prices with 85% accuracy.

Smith & Williamson’s next full update to bondholders is due to be delivered by 29 August.

Exmount Commercial Developments goes dark after lying about its Security Trustee

Exmount Commercial Developments

Exmount Commercial Developments (a trading name of Exmount Construction Limited) offered 3 and 5 year bonds paying 9.12% and 10.35% per year. I reviewed the bonds in April 2018.

According to both investors and Jade State Wealth, Exmount Construction has stopped paying interest and is failing to respond to phone calls.

Jade State Wealth had been hired by Exmount to act as Security Trustee. However, according to Jade State, Exmount failed to comply with anti-money-laundering and liquidity requirements and consequently Jade State withdrew its services in February 2018.

According to Jade State, Exmount has continued to solicit investment regardless while still telling people that the investment was overseen by Jade State. Some of them have fruitlessly contacted Jade State asking where their money is.

A request for comment from myself last week went unanswered. Exmount’s website, exmountcommercial.com, remains up at time of writing. It contains little information and in fact some of it (notably a Complaints Policy) has been copy and pasted from Wellesley.

Exmount bonds were promoted by Amir Damoussi via his company Asset Backed Investments for up to 40% commission. Asset Backed Investments was shut down by the Insolvency Service in May 2019.

Over the past year or so there have been numerous changes to the people in charge at Exmount, according to Companies House. At the time of my review the sole director was Joey Mason. Mason stepped down in May 2018 and was replaced by Ousama Moufid, who was replaced in December 2018 by Elmeki Boukhris, who was replaced in April 2019 by Diana Mahay, who after a Lady-Jane-Grey-like reign of three and a half weeks was replaced by Rakesh Raj, who *breathe* remains director at time of writing.

The ownership of Exmount passed between the directors at the same times, although a confirmation statement has not been filed for Elmeki Boukhris’ brief reign.

At the end of May Rakesh Raj filed micro-company accounts which showed no creditors. This has clearly come as news to the people who thought they had invested in its bonds.

What all this has to do with Exmount Construction going AWOL, and whether any of these people actually exist, is anyone’s guess.

A few days ago Exmount changed its address back to the notorious 2 Woodberry Grove, London. Exmount was formed by a company formations outfit, A1 Company Service, which created numerous off-the-peg companies which were later acquired by binary options and forex scams. Exmount, like all these companies, started life at 2 Woodberry Grove, the home of Barbara Kahan, a former director of A1 who is now 88 years old (if she is still alive).

A1 Company Services is not accused of any wrongdoing as it is not their problem what people do with the companies it forms after buying them. Why Exmount has changed its address back to 2 Woodberry Grove is unclear.

What should I do if I invested with Exmount Construction?

Investors who are owed money by an unregulated firm and aren’t being paid have two practical options: 1) seek legal advice from a registered solicitor, and risk throwing good money after bad, or 2) write it off and forget about it.

If investors are cold-called by anyone claiming they can get their money back from Exmount in return for “legal fees” or “admin fees” or any other payment by the investor, it is a scam. Reputable solicitors do not cold call, and administrators collect their fees from the company, not creditors.